Afghanistan’s Mineral Wealth Opens New Front in Taliban-US Relations
Taliban’s $1 Trillion Mineral Gamble, US Investment Meets an Internal Power Struggle
KABUL: Afghanistan’s vast untapped mineral wealth is emerging as a potential new avenue for engagement between the Taliban government and the United States, even as Washington remains reluctant to invest in the country’s mining sector because of concerns over the Taliban’s record on human rights and governance.
Afghanistan is estimated to possess mineral resources worth more than $1 trillion, including major deposits of copper, lithium, gold, iron ore, rare earth elements, coal and precious stones. Much of this wealth remains undeveloped after decades of war, political instability, inadequate infrastructure and limited foreign investment.
Five years after returning to power, the Taliban are increasingly seeking to turn these natural resources into an economic and diplomatic opportunity. The group has publicly expressed interest in attracting foreign investment to mining, infrastructure, agriculture and trade, hoping that international capital and expertise can help unlock Afghanistan’s largely untapped resource base.
Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi has recently welcomed US investment in Afghanistan, arguing that relations between Kabul and Washington should move beyond the legacy of the two-decade war and toward possible economic cooperation.
The proposal, however, has received a cool response from Washington.
The US State Department has indicated that it has no plans to cooperate with the Taliban in developing Afghanistan’s critical mineral resources, citing concerns that such investment could strengthen a regime accused of widespread repression and restrictions on basic rights.
Yet the debate over Afghanistan’s mineral wealth extends beyond whether the United States should invest.
A more fundamental question is emerging: who would actually control Afghanistan’s minerals, mining contracts and revenues if large-scale foreign investment eventually enters the country?
The answer is complicated by the Taliban’s internal political and economic structure, which, despite its outward appearance of unity, includes competing networks of authority and influence.
Mineral wealth spread across competing power centers
Afghanistan’s mineral resources are geographically dispersed across the country. Badakhshan is known for gold and precious stones, while Logar province contains the strategically important Mes Aynak copper deposit. Significant copper resources have also been identified around Balkhab, while other potentially valuable deposits are located across central, northern and eastern parts of the country.
The geographical distribution of these resources creates a significant political challenge for the Taliban leadership.
Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada has increasingly concentrated political and administrative authority around Kandahar, the ideological and political center of the Taliban movement. However, many of Afghanistan’s most valuable mineral deposits are located hundreds of kilometres away from Kandahar and in provinces where local power structures remain influential.
This creates a potential contradiction: while political authority is becoming increasingly centralized, the natural resources capable of generating substantial revenues remain located in areas where provincial officials, commanders, tribal figures and economic networks can exercise considerable influence.
Control over mining operations can therefore translate into control over taxation, transportation, contracts, security arrangements and revenue flows.
Haqqani network adds another layer
Kandahar is not the only important center of economic influence within the Taliban system.
The Haqqani network, led by Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and historically influential in southeastern Afghanistan, has developed its own political, security and economic networks.
The network’s relationship with Afghanistan’s informal economy and resource extraction is not new. Over the years, it has been associated with revenue-generating activities involving mineral extraction, transportation, taxation and cross-border commerce.
Afghan mining expert Javed Noorani warned in 2022 that the Haqqani network was retaining substantial revenues generated from parts of the mining sector. He also cautioned that competition over natural-resource revenues could contribute to tensions within the Taliban movement.
That warning has gained renewed relevance as the Taliban leadership seeks to bring more economic activity and revenue collection under centralized control.
Mining could become an increasingly important source of state income, political patronage and influence.
The dynamics are similar to those surrounding border crossings. Whoever controls a border can influence customs revenues and trade. Whoever controls a mine can influence contracts, extraction, transportation, taxation and the distribution of resource wealth.
For foreign investors, therefore, a mining agreement signed by authorities in Kabul would not necessarily settle the question of who controls the resource at the provincial level.
Badakhshan highlights the risks
The situation in Badakhshan illustrates the potential challenges.
The mountainous northeastern province, which borders Tajikistan, China and Pakistan, contains significant deposits of gold and precious stones. Mining has long been an important source of income for local power brokers and communities.
In June 2026, the Taliban reportedly deployed a newly established force of around 1,000 personnel to Badakhshan amid tensions surrounding the province’s lucrative gold and precious-stone mining operations.
Taliban-linked sources described the move as part of an effort to weaken economically powerful local commanders and bring mineral resources more directly under the authority of the central leadership in Kandahar.
Several influential local figures were reportedly dismissed, arrested or transferred, while officials regarded as more loyal to Akhundzada and his inner circle were appointed to key positions.
The developments underline a major risk for potential foreign investors: control over Afghanistan’s mineral resources may be contested not only between the Taliban and outside actors, but also within the Taliban’s own political and security networks.
A company could potentially receive approval from central authorities while still facing questions over security, taxation, transportation, local commanders and provincial administration.
Local communities face the greatest risks
Another important element of Afghanistan’s mining debate is the position of communities living near mineral deposits.
Afghanistan has a long history in which valuable natural resources have generated substantial income for armed groups, political figures and local power brokers while providing limited benefits to surrounding populations.
Poorly regulated mining can also have serious environmental and social consequences. Mining operations may damage agricultural land, contaminate or reduce access to water and create dangerous working conditions.
In areas where mining is conducted informally, workers can face tunnel collapses and other life-threatening hazards.
This raises concerns about whether local communities will receive a fair share of mining revenues or whether they will bear most of the environmental and social costs while revenues are transferred to political and economic elites.
The problem could become even more serious if natural resources become tied to internal Taliban competition.
Afghanistan could risk repeating a familiar pattern in which wealth is extracted from peripheral provinces and used to strengthen political authority at the center.
Taliban seek to turn minerals into diplomatic leverage
Muttaqi’s outreach to Washington appears to form part of a broader Taliban strategy to use Afghanistan’s natural resources as an instrument of economic and diplomatic engagement.
The Taliban have already sought mining agreements with foreign partners and have attempted to portray Afghanistan as a country open to international investment.
The invitation to the United States represents a potentially significant extension of that strategy.
For Kabul, American investment would carry importance beyond the financial value of individual mining projects. US involvement could potentially improve Afghanistan’s international economic standing and provide a degree of political recognition to the Taliban administration.
For Washington, however, the proposal presents a difficult dilemma.
The United States is increasingly interested in securing alternative sources of critical minerals and rare earth elements that are important to modern industries, including energy technologies, electronics and advanced manufacturing.
Afghanistan’s mineral reserves could therefore appear strategically attractive.
But investment in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could also provide the regime with significant financial resources and potentially strengthen the political networks that control the country.
Due diligence will be crucial
The question of investment should therefore not be limited to whether Afghanistan possesses valuable minerals.
Any government, international institution or private company considering participation in Afghanistan’s mining sector would need to examine several issues, including ownership of mineral rights, the legitimacy and transparency of contracts, revenue-sharing mechanisms, taxation, security arrangements, environmental protections and the role of local communities.
It would also be essential to determine which political and economic networks ultimately benefit from mining operations.
Afghanistan’s mineral competition is therefore much more complex than a simple confrontation between the Taliban and foreign governments.
It involves the increasingly centralized leadership around Kandahar, the Haqqani network, provincial power holders and local communities, all of whom may have competing interests in the country’s natural resources.
A resource opportunity with political risks
Afghanistan undoubtedly possesses significant mineral potential. If responsibly developed, its resources could provide much-needed government revenue, create employment, improve infrastructure and contribute to long-term economic development.
But mineral wealth alone does not guarantee prosperity.
Without transparent contracts, effective regulation, equitable revenue distribution and meaningful participation by local communities, mining could deepen existing political divisions rather than resolve Afghanistan’s economic problems.
The Taliban may be seeking American capital and technological expertise to unlock the country’s mineral wealth. Washington, meanwhile, may see strategic value in Afghanistan’s deposits but remains wary of strengthening the Taliban government.
For any potential investor, however, the central question may be even more basic: who really controls the minerals?
Until that question is answered clearly, Afghanistan’s vast mineral reserves may remain as much a source of political competition as they are an opportunity for economic development.
Saima Afzal is a researcher specializing in South Asian security, counterterrorism and geopolitical dynamics across the Middle East, Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific. She is currently a research scholar at Justus Liebig University, Germany.
Source: Asian Times
